Abstract: This paper investigates the background to Leibniz's doctrine of the fictionality of infinitesimal magnitudes and the consequences the doctrine has for his account of the foundations of the calculus. It first traces the connection between Leibniz's doctrine of "incomparably small" magnitudes and Hobbes's doctrine of conatus, particularly as it is applied to the study of geometric figures. The concluding sections consider the application of this doctrine to disputes about the reality of infinitesimal magnitudes.
3 that the Leibnizian theory of the incomparably small (yet finite) magnitude has its roots in the Hobbesian of conats. I will briefly outline the role conatus in the Hobbesian approach to geometry; with this material in hand, I will investigate some of Leibniz's pronouncements on the foundations of his calculus with the aim of showing that these owe a significant debt to Hobbes's proposals.
Hobbes, Conatus, and the Mathematics of Motion
Hobbes first introduced the concept of conatus in his 1655 treatise De Corpore --a work presented as the first part of the elements of philosophy and containing Hobbes's doctrines on the nature of body as well as his exposition of a thoroughly materialistic philosophy of mathematics. As Hobbes defines it, conatus is essentially a point motion, or motion through an indefinitely small space: "conatus" he declares, "is motion through a space and a time less than any given, that is, less than any determined whether by exposition or assigned by number, that is, through a point." (Hobbes [1839 (Hobbes [ -45] 1966a 177) Hobbes employs his idiosyncratic conception of points here, in which a point is an extended body, but one sufficiently small that its magnitude is not considered in a demonstration. In explicating the definition of conatus he therefore remarks that "it should be recalled that by a point is not understood that which has no quantity, or which can by no means be divided (for nothing of this sort is in the nature of things), but that whose quantity is not considered, that is, neither its quantity nor any of its parts are computed in demonstration, so that a point is not taken for indivisible, but for undivided.
And as also an instant is to be taken as an undivided time, not an indivisible time." 4 (Hobbes 1966a 1: 177-8) The result is that conatus is a kind of "tendency toward motion" or a striving to move in a particular direction.
This definition allows for a further concept of impetus, or the instantaneous velocity of a moving point; the velocity of the point at an instant can be understood as the ratio of the distance moved to the time elapsed in a conatus. In Hobbes's terms "impetus is this velocity [of a moving thing] but considered in any point of time in which the transit is made. And so impetus is nothing other than the quantity or velocity of this conatus." (Hobbes [1839-45] 1966a 1:178) The concepts of conatus and impetus are basic to Hobbes's analysis of motion, and it is not great exaggeration to say that his whole program for natural philosophy, which he deemed the true science of motion, is drawn from his account of conatus and impetus.
The concepts of impetus and conatus can be applied to the case of geometric magnitudes as well as to moving bodies. Because Hobbes held that geometric magnitudes are generated by the motion of points, lines, or surfaces, he also held that one could inquire into the velocities with which these magnitudes are generated, and this inquiry can be extended to the ratios between magnitudes and their generating motions.
For example, take a curve to be traced by the motion of a point, and at any given stage in the generation of the curve, this generating point will have a (directed) instantaneous velocity. This, in turn, can be regarded as the ratio between the indefinitely small distance covered in an indefinitely small time; this ratio will be a finite magnitude which can be expressed as the inclination of the tangent to the curve at the point. Consider, for instance the curve αβ as in figure 1. The conatus of its generating point at any instant will be the "point motion" with which an indefinitely small part of the curve is generated; the impetus at any stage in the curve's production will be expressed as the ratio of the distance covered to the time elapsed in the conatus. Represent the time by the x-axis and the distance moved by the y-axis. Then (assuming time to flow uniformly), the instantaneous impetus will be the ratio between the instantaneous increment along to the y-axis to the increment along the x-axis. The tangent to the curve at the point p is the right line that continues or extends the conatus a p; or, equivalently, the tangent is the dilation or expansion of the point motion into a right line.
It is important to observe here that the tangent is constructed as a finite ratio between two quantities that, in themselves, are small enough to be disregarded. That is to say, the ratio between two "inconsiderable" quantities may itself be a considerable quantity. Hobbes emphasizes this feature of his system when he stresses that points may be larger or smaller than one another, although in themselves they are quantities too small to be considered in a geometric demonstration. Thus, in discussing the comparisons that may be made between one conatus and another, Hobbes declares: "as a point may be compared with a point, so a conatus can be compared with a conatus, and one may be found to be greater or less than another. For if the vertical points of two angles are compared to one another, they will be equal or unequal in the ratio of the angles themselves to one another; or if a right line cuts many circumferences of concentric circles, the points of intersection will be unequal in the same ratio which the perimeters have to one another." ( [1839-45] 1966a, 1: 178) Hobbes's concepts of conatus and impetus can also be applied to the general problem of quadrature by analyzing the area of a plane figure as the product of a moving line and time. Hobbes himself was eager to solve problems of quadrature (most notably 6 the quadrature of the circle), and it is here that his concept of conatus is put most fully to work. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the third part of De Corpore (which bears the title "On the Ratios of Motions and Magnitudes") is Hobbes's attempt to furnish a general method for finding quadratures. In the very simplest case, the whole impetus imparted to a body throughout a uniform motion is representable as a rectangle, one side of which is the line representing the instantaneous impetus while the other represents the time during which the body is moved. More complex cases can then be developed by [ Figure 2] The subject of chapter 17 is "deficient figures," and it presents something very much like an early analysis of integration. In Hobbes's parlance the deficient figure ABDGA in figure 2 is produced by the motion of the right line BD through BA, while BD diminishes to a point at A. The "complete figure" corresponding to the deficient figure is the rectangle ABDC, produced by the motion of BC through AB without diminishing.
The complement of the deficient figure is DGAC, the figure that, when added to the deficient figure, makes the complete figure. Hobbes proposes to determine the ratio of the area of the deficient figure to its complement, given a specified rate of decrease of the quantity BD. He concludes that the ratio of the deficient figure to its comp0lement is the same as the ratio between corresponding lines in the deficient figure and their counterparts in the complement. As he states the theorem in article 2 of chapter 17:
A deficient figure, which is made by a quantity continually decreasing until it vanishes, according to ratios everywhere proportional and commensurable, is to its complement as the ratio of the whole altitude to an altitude diminished at any time is to the ratio of the whole quantity which describes the figure, to the same quantity diminished in the same time.
Thus, if the rate of diminution of BD is uniform the line AD will be a right line (the diagonal of the rectangle), and the deficient figure will be to its complement in the ratio of one to one. In more complex cases, as when BD decreases as the square of the diminished altitude, the area of the deficient figure will be twice that of its complement.
And, in general, if the line BD decreases as the power n, the ratio of the deficient figure to its complement will be n:1.
In the fourth of his six Exercationes Geometricae Cavalieri pursued a result that historians of mathematics generally characterize as the attempt to prove the geometric equivalent of the theorem that the integral from zero to a of x n dx is equal to a In any parallelogram such as BD [as in Figure 2 and arithmetic of infinities; it shows that there is nothing in the realm of nature without parts; that the parts of any continuum are in fact infinite; that the theory of angles is that of the quantities of unextended bodies; that motion is stronger than motion, and conatus stronger than conatus --however, conatus is instantaneous motion through a point, and so a point may be greater than a point" (Oldenburg 1965-77, 8: 22) .
The "geometry of indivisibles" and the "arithmetic of infinities" to which Leibniz refers are, I take it, the works of Cavalieri and John Wallis. Cavalieri's method of indivisibles is mentioned explicitly in section six of the Theoria motus abstracti, as a theory whose "truth is obviously demonstrated so that we must think of certain rudiments, so to speak, or beginnings of lines and figures, as smaller than any given magnitude whatever." (GP 4: 228). Wallis's 1655 treatise Arithmetica Infinitorum,
although not mentioned explicitly in the text, is evidently referred to in the letter to
Oldenburg when Leibniz refers to the "arithmetic of infinities". In light of this, it is no great interpretive leap to see Leibniz connecting the doctrine of conatus with the classic problem of quadrature, just as Hobbes had done, and thus to find part of the origin of the calculus in Leibniz's close reading of De Corpore.
It would doubtless be going to far to claim that the whole of Leibniz's calculus is simply the application of Hobbes's ideas. It is well known that Leibniz's mathematical thought was also strongly influenced by Galileo's approach to the geometry of indivisibles, for example, and the influence of Huygens cannot be overlooked. Nor, for that matter, can Pascal's investigations into infinite sums and differences. All of these are, without question, part of the background to Leibniz's calculus. Nevertheless, we can agree that Hobbes was one among many whose writings stimulated the development of the Leibnizian approach to the calculus. However, there is one important difference 11 between the Leibnizian and Hobbesian conceptions of conatus that is significant:
Leibniz's language (at least in the Theoria motus abstracti) strongly implies that conatus be a literally infinitesimal quantity, while Hobbes regards it as having finite magnitude, but one so small as to be disregarded. In the end, however, Leibniz adopted a doctrine not far removed from Hobbes's. There is an obvious parallel between such "incomparably small" elements of lines or surfaces Hobbes's conception of points, for it is exactly the hallmark of Hobbes's points that --though finite --they are too small to be considered in any demonstration.
Incomparable Magnitudes and the Question of Rigor
Leibniz's preference here for the language of the incomparable rather than the infinitesimal raises the question of whether such incomparable magnitudes are to be thought of as literally infinitesimal or whether they should be treated as finite but negligible quantities in the manner of Hobbes's points.
At first sight, one might take Leibniz's reply to Nieuwentijt as defending the reality of infinitesimals, seeing the term "incomparably small" as a kind of euphemism for "infinitesimal." But I think such an interpretation ultimately fails. Leibniz declares that it is enough to show that incomparably small quantities can be justly neglected in a calculation, and he refers to certain "lemmas communicated by me in February of 1689"
for the full justification of this procedure (GM 5: 322). These lemmas of 1689 are contained in Leibniz's Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis (GM, 6: 144-160). But when we turn to them for enlightenment, two points become tolerably clear. First, these "incomparable" quantities were intended explicitly to avoid references to infinitesimals and instead to replace infinitesimal magnitudes with finite differences sufficiently small to be ignored in practice. Second, the doctrine of the incomparable has a very strong analogy with Hobbes's treatment of points, conatus, and impetus. The paragraph expounding these lemmas opens with the declaration that I have assumed in the demonstrations incomparably small quantities, for example the difference between two common quantities which is incomparable with the quantities themselves. Such matters as these, if I
am not mistaken, can be set forth most lucidly in what follows. And then if someone does not want to employ infinitely small quantities, he can take them to be as small as he judges sufficient to be incomparable, so that they produce an error of no importance and even smaller than any given [error] .
Just as the Earth is taken for a point, or the diameter of the Earth for a line infinitely small with respect to the heavens, so it can be demonstrated that if the sides of an angle have a base incomparably less than them, the comprehended angle will be incomparably less than a rectilinear angle, and the difference between the sides will be incomparable with the sides themselves; also, the difference between the whole sine, the sine of the complement, and the secant will be incomparable to these differences.
(GM, 6: 150-1)
The use intended for such incomparably small magnitudes is to avoid disputes about the nature or existence of infinitesimal quantities, and Leibniz holds that "it is possible to use ordinary [communia] triangles similar to the unassignable ones, which have a great use in finding tangents, maxima, minima, and for investigating the curvature of lines." (GM, 6: 150) In other words, the lemmas on incomparable magnitudes are to serve as a foundation for the calculus which permits the talk of infinitesimals to be reinterpreted in terms of incomparable (but apparently finite) differences. These lemmas loom large in Leibniz's writings on the foundations of the calculus, since he almost invariably refers back to them in later discussions on the nature of the infinitesimal. It is also significant that the incomparably small satisfies Hobbes's definition of a geometric point --it is a quantity sufficiently small that its magnitude cannot be regarded in a demonstration.
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Fictional Infinitesimals and Incomparable Magnitudes.
When we turn to Leibniz's treatment of the foundations of the calculus after 1700, the theme of the fictionality of the infinitesimal becomes more clearly defined. There were two controversies in the Parisian Academie des Sciences that drew Leibniz into a discussion of the nature of infinitesimals, and in both cases he elaborated a theory in which the infinitesimal turns out to be a fictional entity, albeit a fiction that is sufficiently well-grounded that it cannot lead from true premises to a false conclusion. The first of these controversies was initiated by Michel Rolle, who argued that the notion of an infinitesimal was not only inconsistent, but that the calculus that employed it could lead to error. The second controversy concerned the logarithms of negative numbers and pitted Leibniz against Jean Bernoulli. I lack the time to go into either of these in detail, but Leibniz's pronouncements offer a chance to see the ultimate status of his theory of the infinitesimal.
In a famous letter to M. Pinson, parts of which were published in the Journal de Sçavans in 1701, Leibniz offered his opinion on the controversy initiated by Rolle. In the letter, he responded to an anonymous criticism of the infinitesimal which Abbé
Gouye had published in the Journal. Leibniz argued in reply that there is no need to take the infinite here rigorously, but only as when we say in optics that the rays of the sun come from a point infinitely distant, and thus are regarded as parallel. And when there are more degrees of infinity, or infinitely small, it is as the sphere of the earth is regarded as a point in respect to the distance of the sphere of the fixed stars, and a ball which we hold in the hand is also a point in comparison with the semidiameter of the 15 sphere of the earth. And then the distance to the fixed stars is infinitely infinite or an infinity of infinities in relation to the diameter of the ball. For in place of the infinite or the infinitely small we can take quantities as great or as small as is necessary in order that the error will be less than any given error. In this way we only differ from the style of Archimedes in the expressions, which are more direct in our method and better adapted to the art of discovery. (GM, These remarks are of a piece with Leibniz's earlier claims about the eliminability of infinitesimal magnitudes: he denies that the calculus really needs to rely upon considerations of the infinite and again insists that it can be based on a procedure of taking finite but "negligible" errors that can be made as small as desired. And again, it is worth observing that Hobbes used essentially the same language, comparing the earth to a point in comparison to the heavens. In his reply to Varignon Leibniz issued a summary statement of his views on the infinite and its role in the calculus. This statement brings together themes we have already seen: the fictional nature of infinitesimals, the possibility of basing the calculus upon a science of incomparably small (but still finite) differences, and the equivalence of the new methods and the Archimedean techniques of exhaustion. After assuring Varignon that his intention was "to point out that it is unnecessary to make mathematical analysis depend on metaphysical controversies or to make sure that there are lines in nature which are infinitely small in a rigorous sense" (Leibniz to Varignon, 2 February, 1702; GM 4: 91), Leibniz once again suggests that incomparably small magnitudes be taken in place of the genuine infinite. These incomparables would provide "as many degrees of incomparability as one may wish;" and although they are really finite quantities they can still be neglected, in accordance with the notorious "lemmas on The full scope of this "fictionalist" reading of the infinite was not made widely known, largely because Leibniz and his associates had reason to fear that any public retreat from a full commitment to the reality of the infinitesimal would complicate the already difficult battle for the acceptance of the calculus. As Leibniz explained in a late letter "When our friends were disputing in France with the Abbé Gallois, father Gouye and others, I told them that I did not believe at all that there were actually infinite or actually infinitesimal quantities; the latter, like the imaginary roots of algebra √-1 were only fictions, which however could be used for the sake of brevity or in order to speak over the nature of ratios between positive and negative quantities, which grew to include the cases of logarithms and roots of negative numbers. Jean Bernoulli (who was also a firm believer in the reality of infinitesimals and a chief partisan in favor of the Leibnizian calculus in the Academie) held that logarithms of negative numbers were the same as those of positive numbers, so that the logarithm of − a is the same a the logarithm of a.
Leibniz treated the issue of negative quantities in ratios, logarithms, and roots as fictions that could be harmlessly employed in calculation, but which did not correspond to anything mathematically real. In Leibniz's view, there is no ratio of +1 to − 1 (as Bernoulli required), since otherwise it would be the same as the ratio of −1 to +1.
Likewise, the fictionality of the infinitesimal is stated in language that seems to have been almost borrowed from Hobbes.
In objecting to the notion that there could be a proper ratio between positive and negative quantities, Leibniz remarked:
just as I have denied of the reality of a ratio, one of whose terms is less than zero, I equally deny that there is properly speaking an infinite number, or an infinitely small number, or any infinite line or a line infinitely small.... The infinite, whether continuous or discrete, is not properly a unity, nor a whole, nor a quantity, and when by analogy we use it in this sense, it is a certain facon de parler; I should say that when a multiplicity of objects exceeds any number, we nevertheless attribute to them by analogy a number, and we call it infinite. And thus I once established that when we call an error infinitely small, we wish only to say an error less than any given, and thus nothing in reality. And when we compare an ordinary term, an infinite term, and one infinitely infinite, it is exactly as if we were to compare, in increasing order, the diameter of a grain of dust, the diameter of the earth, and that of the sphere of the fixed stars.... (GM V, 389) One striking feature of this late publication is Leibniz's reminiscence about his Paris period. Leibniz recalls his encounters with the work of Arnauld, Wallis, and Joachim Jung in the 1670s, and it is precisely during this period that Leibniz was working on the Theoria motus abstracti and still very much under the influence of Hobbes. As Marc Parmentier has put it, "the first lines of his article incline one to think that the recent polemic [over the nature of ratios] had revived a personal recollection that forty years of intense diplomatic, scientific, and historical activity had not been able to erase, and which suddenly came into his memory with its original clarity" (423).
Conclusions.
This very brief account of Leibniz's doctrine of the ficitionality of the infinitesimal raises perhaps more questions than it answers. I would like to close by considering two important consequences of Leibniz's doctrine of the fictional infinitesimal. The first is the question of how Leibniz might guarantee that the infinitesimal is, indeed, a wellfounded fiction. The second, and related, issue is whether there is a stable conception of mathematical that underlies Leibniz's writings on the calculus.
A fiction is well-founded in the Leibnizian sense when it does not lead us astray, so that indulgence in the fiction is harmless. The basic idea here seems to be something to the effect that we can "speak with the vulgar" when we employ the language of the infinitesimal, but "think with the learned" when we recognize that there really are no such things. Yet we still stand in need of some sort of guarantee that we will not, in fact, be led astray. In the mathematical context, this means that we need some kind of proof to the effect that infinitesimals can always, at least in principle, be eliminated and reasoning that depends on them can be replaced by reasoning that considers only finite differences between finite quantities. Leibniz often makes grand programmatic statements to the effect that derivations which presuppose infinitesimals can always be re-cast as exhaustion proofs in the style of Archimedes. But Leibniz never, so far as I know, attempted anything like a general proof of the eliminability of the infinitesimal, or offered anything approaching a universal scheme for re-writing the procedures of the calculus in terms of exhaustion proofs. The closest thing we have are the notorious "lemmas on incomparable magnitudes" from 1689, but these are really more promissory notes with a serious admixture of hand-waving rather than rigorous proofs. What, then, are we to make of Leibniz's confidence that the infinitesimal is a well-founded fiction? He was certainly aware that some infinitesimal arguments could lead to paradox and contradiction, but it is unclear whether he had a surefire way of avoiding error.
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A related issue is what the Leibnizian conception of mathematical rigor really looks like. As classically understood, a rigorous argument is one that begins with transparently true first principles, proceeds by valid inference procedures, and deals only with objects that are clearly conceived. It is far from clear whether Leibniz would allow that the proof procedures of the calculus are, in fact, rigorous in this sense. After all, the infinitesimal is not the sort of thing we can conceive clearly, and it seems a bit odd to think that there might be transparently true first principles that deal with merely fictional objects. In the end, then, we might ask whether classifying infinitesimals as "useful fictions" can really deflect the criticism of the calculus which characterizes it as unrigorous. This is not an issue I'm in any position to resolve at the moment, and will leave it for another day
